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Chapter 19
It was a “simple”, “positive”  
story of African self-help 
(manufactured for a Kenyan  
NGO by advertising 
multinationals)
Kate Wright
Northern news organisations now face a perfect financial storm, which has 
been shaped by a variety of factors, including the rise of new media com-
petitors like Google and Yahoo, regulatory change, the cost of developing 
new technologies, and dwindling advertising revenue (Franklin 2011). This 
has prompted widespread cost-cutting and the privileging of production 
practices geared towards producing more content, faster, and at lower cost 
(Phillips 2012). So it is perhaps unsurprising that news outlets’ depend-
ence upon the “information subsidies” (Gandy 1982) provided by external 
sources has increased, including their reliance upon the material supplied 
by public relations professionals (Lewis et al. 2008a, 2008b).
These changes have been compounded in the coverage of sub-Saharan 
Africa by reductions in the numbers of news bureaus and correspondent 
posts funded by international news organisations (Paterson 2011: 39–40). 
Those who remain, have often had to accept casualised posts that involve 
their being paid per item, so they struggle to leave their desks. Cuts to news-
room budgets also make it much harder for those working in the head-
quarters of such news organisations to justify trips to African countries 
themselves (Dozier 2008). Yet many journalists remain committed to rep-
resenting a wide variety of people and places for a mixture of normative, 
legal, and commercial reasons.
In such circumstances, news outlets are increasingly turning to 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to supply them with video and 
photographic images representing events in more remote or dangerous 
locations in Africa.1 Large, wealthy international NGOs (INGOs) tend to 
dominate this field of media production because they can afford to fund 
extensive travel and expensive communications technology, as well as hiring 
experienced former journalists with the cultural and social capital necessary 
to create and pitch such multimedia to news outlets (Fenton 2010). Thus 
using INGO-provided video and photos is regarded by some as improving 
journalism’s dynamism and social engagement (Beckett & Mansell 2008), 
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but others argue that it seriously damages the diversity and critical inde-
pendence of news coverage (Cottle & Nolan 2007; Franks 2008).
Journalists’ concerns about their potential complicity in enhancing 
the brands of powerful INGOs (Magee 2014) are often tied to other 
worries about some INGOs’ tendency to use negative, stereotypical, and 
decontextualised images of Africans requiring wealthy Northerners’ help 
(Lugo-Ocando 2015). Such arguments are underpinned by the conviction 
that negative media representations perpetuate chronic under-develop-
ment by reinforcing notions that the entire African continent is a hopeless 
case. Indeed, even the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, has 
asserted that international journalists have a responsibility to avoid harm-
ing African peoples’ prospects and global standing through “negative type-
casting” (cited in de Beer 2010: 602).
One solution, which has been explored by some British journalists, 
is to use photos provided by African NGOs, when these are of sufficient 
technical and aesthetic quality (Wright 2015). But, unless they were long-
standing Africa editors, these journalists tended to assume that smaller, 
poorer African NGOs would be simpler and less dominated by commercial 
marketing practices and norms than major INGOs. So, they reasoned, dis-
seminating such NGOs’ representations of African people “helping them-
selves” would be more progressive, “positive”, and “empowering”. These 
assumptions were further enhanced by the ways in which these images were 
frequently obtained through social media, so tapping into broader hopes 
about the potential of digital media to foster more diverse and egalitarian 
modes of media production (Beckett & Mansell 2008).
The purpose of this chapter is to debunk such simplistic assump-
tions. It draws on Davis’ theory about “promotional cultures” (2013) and 
Chouliaraki’s work about “ironic spectatorship” (2013), as well as critiques 
made elsewhere in this volume about “Africa Rising” narratives, in order to 
analyse a particularly illuminating case study. This was constructed using 
internal documentation and semi-structured interviews with those who 
made key decisions shaping the production of a single journalistic article. It 
contained a still photograph produced for a campaign run by the Kenyan 
Paraplegic Organization (KPO), in conjunction with the telecommunica-
tions company Safaricom, and Scangroup, an Africa-wide network of adver-
tising and marketing professionals based in Nairobi, which includes the 
global PR giant Ogilvy & Mather.
This article appeared in the British Sunday newspaper The Observer 
(Kiberenge 2012), although similar items about the campaign appeared 
outside the sampling period in one of Kenya’s leading newspapers, The 
Standard, as well as in a number of prestigious international news outlets, 
including Al Jazeera, The New York Times, and BBC News Online. However, 
this case study is significant not only because the story was picked up 
by these major news outlets, but also because participants insisted that 
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commercial businesses often develop media campaigns with African NGOs 
to enhance their reputations in the continent’s highly lucrative emerging 
markets.
Corporate social responsibility, promotional 
cultures, and expats
Like many smaller NGOs, KPO lacked the financial and cultural capital 
needed to produce its own multimedia (Fenton 2010). So when the NGO 
wanted to raise money to build a new spinal injuries rehabilitation clinic 
in Nairobi, its leader approached an acquaintance who was a senior execu-
tive at major commercial telecommunications company Safaricom, which 
is also based in Nairobi. This executive was involved with Safaricom’s cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) programme,2 which often “adopted” 
local NGOs (interview 23 April 2013). This was a strategy that Safaricom’s 
Executive Director hoped would pay handsome dividends in terms of 
consumer goodwill and investor interest (Baillie, cited in Standard Digital 
2010). Indeed, Safaricom’s CSR programme seems to have functioned as a 
specific form of public relations exercise – crisis management (Demetrious 
2013). This was because it was launched in 2009, shortly after allegations 
of serious corruption involving the company were finally dropped in Kenya 
and the UK (Kenya National Assembly 2007; interview, UK Serious Fraud 
Office, 20 June 2014).
So KPO’s campaign was shaped by highly commercialised promotional 
cultures (Davis 2013) long before the executive in question ever approached 
Scangroup, a pan-African network of advertising and communications com-
panies that normally produces marketing campaigns for Safaricom. This 
executive asked Scangroup – whose members include RedSky advertising, 
Scanad communications, Squad Digital, and the global PR giant Ogilvy & 
Mather – to design a campaign with KPO on a pro bono basis, which would 
incorporate Safaricom’s mobile donation platform, M-PESA (interview). 
As Scangroup staff explained, this was not unusual, as they were often 
approached by large businesses asking them to design campaigns for 
African NGOs as part of their CSR schemes, which were envisaged by these 
businesses as a key part of their brand-management strategy (interview 4 
May 2013; interview 18 April 2013).
Scangroup staff also talked about the “sympathy” they had for the indi-
vidual Kenyan paraplegics whom they had met, but they were far more 
motivated by the greater creative freedom allowed to them in pro bono work. 
In particular, working on the KPO campaign offered the European and 
Australian expats who dominated RedSky’s creative team the opportunity 
to design a cutting-edge “360°” campaign, which incorporated social and 
mainstream media (interview). Thus they hoped to be able to compete for 
international industry awards in order not only to consolidate their position 
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in the pan-African advertising market, but also to “sell” themselves in an 
increasingly harsh and insecure global job market. As an advertising execu-
tive at RedSky explained:
There’s a lot of people out there struggling with their careers and with, 
you know, with the global financial crisis ... [sighs].
So you really need to prove that you can ... go beyond the normal. ...
As a creative, you’re always wanting to do work that gets you noticed, 
that brands you as an innovative thinker, because, on a selfish note, you 
know ... you’re looking after your own career. (interview)
So the KPO campaign was very much designed according to the interests 
and norms of the commercial actors who were involved. This entailed 
Scangroup creating a “saleable event” (Davis 2013: 2) that its staff hoped 
would stimulate regular small donations from poorer Kenyan people, as 
well as larger donations from Kenyan elites and international audiences. 
First, an advertising executive at RedSky came up with the idea of asking a 
member of KPO to wheel himself from Nairobi to Johannesburg in South 
Africa – nearly three thousand kilometres away – where KPO claimed the 
nearest spinal injury rehabilitation centre was located. Next, this “event” 
was made even more “saleable” (Davis 2013: 2) by using another agency 
within Scangroup, Squad Digital, to track this person’s progress using GPS. 
This information was then used in order to publish constant Facebook 
updates, Tweets, and embedded photo and video feeds, so stimulating a 
social media storm in order to attract the attention of the national and 
international media.
Scangroup staff then set about finding a “saleable individual” to embed 
in this “saleable event” (Davis 2013: 2). They interviewed a number of pos-
sible candidates before selecting Zack Kimotho, not only because of his 
level of fitness and determination, but also because of his marketability. As 
a senior figure at Scanad, who was involved in this decision-making process, 
explained,
He was a vet before he got shot and he’s got two kids. But, you know, 
he’s determined to live his life, and erm ... that kind of thing was always 
going to go down well.
Plus, you know, like a lot of people here, he’s a very big-hearted fella 
and wanted to do something to help other people in his condition. ...
And ... we thought it would be like a secondary er ... bonus if we got 
somebody, you know ... who’s a good-looking guy. (interview)
So although the NGO campaign was not consciously designed in relation 
to mainstream news values, it was timely, involved an extensive journey, 
and was highly personalised, with an obvious “human interest” focus 
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(Harcup & O’Neill 2001). Indeed, these expat advertising and marketing 
executives framed the campaign in ways that were deliberately designed 
to persuade media audiences that the key problem was Kimotho having to 
continue on his arduous journey, and that the solution to this problem was 
for them to “Bring Zack Back Home” by giving enough money via M-PESA 
to enable a new rehabilitation centre to be built.
Selling representations of African “empowerment”
This emphasis on the positive but low-intensity emotions of audiences; 
the marketisation of suffering; the simple, immediate, and technologi-
cally delivered “solution” offered via communications technology; and on 
the capabilities of mediation itself, seems to mark the KPO campaign out 
as an example of post-humanitarian communication (Chouliaraki 2013). 
As such, it might be expected to be detached from the traditional grand 
narratives that link emancipation to solidarity (Chouliaraki 2013: 9–15). 
However, despite the framing of the campaign by the commercialised 
norms of largely European and Australian expats, it was legitimised accord-
ing to normative ideas about Kenyan empowerment and collective self-
help. This was because the campaign was conceptualised by the expats who 
developed the project as “capitalising upon” the success of the “Kenyans for 
Kenya” campaign, which had been run in the previous year by a coalition 
of charities and businesses (including Safaricom), to help those suffering 
from famine in the north of the country (interviews).
Indeed, the Kenyan account manager at Ogilvy & Mather said he had 
been appointed to deal with press enquiries because of his previous experi-
ence on that campaign, so enhancing journalists’ trust via this value-laden 
association (interview 27 March 2013). Thus he pitched the campaign to 
journalists in a similar manner, arguing that “we Kenyans shouldn’t all the 
time rely on the government or external donors ... to solve problems for 
us” (interview). But serious questions must be raised about the extent to 
which the campaign rested on principles of Kenyan empowerment, because 
a senior figure at RedSky, who was a British expat, said that some of KPO’s 
lower-ranking members had objected to the plan and that he had over-
ruled them. As he put it,
What happened was some [KPO members] thought the idea [for the 
campaign] was too big and we were asked to do a Plan B.
So I got everybody in a meeting in front of RedSky and did the “Over 
my dead body, this is not going to happen” number. “You can’t not go 
with this now.”
But [some KPO members] still thought it had got out of hand and 
that, maybe, we were doing the wrong thing. ... 
Yeah ... there was a lot of bad feeling there. (interview)3
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This displacement of Kenyan non-elites was not evident to Kenyan diaspora, 
who shared the campaign widely on Facebook and Twitter, so bringing it 
to the attention of a Kenyan journalist working on an internship with The 
Observer in London (interview 28 August 2012).4 He then pitched this as a 
story idea to his duty editor, who pitched it to her senior editor, who agreed 
to allow the intern to proceed because, as he put it,
When it comes to stories about Africa, we try and include as wide a 
range as possible so it’s not all, well, here’s another story about a dis-
astrous situation in an African country brought about through war or 
poverty or what have you.
Reflecting on media trends is part of our effort to have more varied 
coverage of the continent, which is itself extremely varied and going 
through some extraordinary, and often very positive, transformations. 
(interview 30 April 2013).
In this way, a story that was ostensibly about Kenyan empowerment and 
solidarity became subsumed by a broader “Africa Rising” narrative. Such 
narratives tend to articulate progress and self-help in privatised, technocen-
tric, and mediacentric terms, so pose little challenge to Anglo-American 
cultural norms and neoliberal media markets. Thus they can be easily 
co-opted by Northern news organisations and used within their own com-
mercial strategies. In this case, journalists hoped that the story would help 
the paper stand out from its rivals, operating as a kind of “information sub-
sidy” (Gandy 1982) relating to market differentiation. Yet had they checked 
they would have found that Kenya’s The Standard (Standard Digital 2012), 
Al Jazeera (Greste 2012), and The New York Times (Gettleman 2012) had 
already covered the KPO campaign. The BBC then covered the story two 
days later (BBC 2012).
In particular, Observer journalists hoped that the story would attract audi-
ences because it would be uplifting and easy to read; and, as a duty news 
editor explained, a Sunday newspaper “cannot be all doom and gloom” 
(interview 23 November 2012). However, journalists’ conceptualisation of 
this as an unchallenging, “positive” story prevented them from scrutinis-
ing the issues and values concerned: indeed, the duty news editor thought 
that it was not just a “light” news story but also a “simple” one, “one of 
the most straightforward that we do” (interview). Thus the only original 
research that the intern was tasked with carrying out was to call and inter-
view Kimotho himself.
This lack of investigative research meant that neither the intern nor 
Observer journalists ever had the opportunity to discover that KPO had no 
plans about how to fund the equipment, staff, and running costs of a newly 
built rehabilitation clinic (interviews). Journalists also failed to explore the 
NGO’s political links, even though these were detailed on KPO’s website, 
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and even though the production of this article occurred in the run-up 
to a Kenyan general election. In particular, the site listed the spouse of 
the then Prime Minister, as a member of KPO’s advisory panel (Kenyan 
Paraplegic Organization website, n.d.). However, even if Observer journalists 
had checked the website, they may not have understood what they read. 
This was because cost-cutting at the paper had led to the roles of the inter-
national and home news editor being merged, and the duty news editor was 
painfully aware of how little she understood about Kenyan politics (inter-
view). So The Observer may have inadvertently boosted the cultural capital of 
a senior figure in KPO, who successfully ran for office for the same political 
party less than six months later.
“Dramatising reality”
Finally, journalists’ uncritical use of the KPO photograph and the interpre-
tative frame in which it was embedded was problematic because the KPO 
campaign – and all of the news stories about it – depended upon Kimotho’s 
determination to go all the way to Johannesburg if necessary. Yet no logisti-
cal plans, financial budgets, fundraising licences, or travel permits had ever 
been put in place to allow him to continue over the Kenyan border. This 
was because none of those involved had anticipated that Kimotho would 
need to go that far before enough money had been raised (interviews). So 
the KPO campaign was based on a kind of “pseudo-event” (Boorstin 1961).
Indeed, Kimotho had already stopped his journey by the time that the 
Kenyan intern made his call on behalf of The Observer. The intern said the 
PR person at Ogilvy & Mather told him that this was a temporary break 
because Kimotho was exhausted and because Safaricom needed to apply 
for a new fundraising licence (interview). But more senior figures in the 
campaign said that Kimotho’s journey was also curtailed because donations 
had already tailed off (interviews).5 When challenged about why those in 
charge of the campaign had not been more transparent with The Observer 
about the extent of Zack’s journey, those involved in commercial marketing 
and advertising insisted that they had not intended to mislead journalists. 
Instead, they had acted according to the commercialised, “promotional” 
logic (Davis 2013) normal in their lines of work. As one put it,
We [were] just dramatising it ... like in advertising. It is just [using] crea-
tive licence ... to move towards an objective. It is [about creating] a mood, 
a goal, a feeling – in our case, that was to fundraise, yeah? (interview)
Indeed, all of those involved repeatedly described news coverage as a form 
of “advertising” or “publicity” donated by media owners (interviews).
Observer journalists, like others in the broader study from which this 
piece is drawn, were not aware of the problems caused by their uncritical 
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acceptance of the image produced for the KPO campaign and the narra-
tives in which it was embedded. Much of this was due to the dominance of 
multiskilling, which led to widespread redundancies among photojournal-
ists and picture editors. This meant that overworked subeditors were rou-
tinely expected to source, select, and attribute photos, even though they 
had little or no image-related training. The ways in which specialised under-
standings about visual meaning had been marginalised in news outlets also 
meant that journalists tended to regard pictures as simply “illustrating” the 
written story. So when subeditors omitted or made mistakes with pictorial 
attribution in their haste to carry out all of their tasks before deadlines, 
these errors weren’t seen as being particularly significant.
In this case, when the senior editor at The Observer was made aware that the 
photo had been taken by commercial actors working for an NGO campaign, 
and that it had not been attributed at all because of a subeditor’s error, he 
claimed that no serious harm had been done (interview). Instead, he rea-
soned that, because the article was about the KPO campaign and because 
the photo showed Kimotho in his wheelchair in front of a long road, it was 
“obvious what it’s about” (interview). But even the photo itself was not what 
it seemed to be – it was a still taken from a staged TV advertisement.
Conclusion
This case study shows that Northern journalists are in danger of losing the 
critical judgement they need to analyse images of Africa circulated by others 
through social media at the same time as they have become more depend-
ent upon them. Widespread redundancies among photojournalists and 
picture editors have made contributed photos seem like attractive “informa-
tion subsidies” (Gandy 1982), while news outlets have become far less able 
to evaluate their visual meanings. Role-merging, multiskilling, and the sheer 
speed of news production have also combined to erode journalists’ ability to 
interrogate and contextualise contributed material using traditional forms 
of investigative research grounded in geographic specialisation.
However, journalists’ inability to exercise critical judgement has also 
been shaped by their desire to counteract what they believe to be com-
mon, negative stereotypes about Africa. This is simultaneously a normative 
and a commercial intention: encompassing considerations about attracting 
larger media audiences and differentiating news output in a fiercely com-
petitive market, as well as moral/political commitments to “diversity” and 
African “empowerment”. But appealing and positive “human interest” sto-
ries about the continent were rarely seen by journalists as meriting detailed 
investigation of specific political and economic alliances, vested interests, 
or areas of contention.
This problem was then compounded by journalists’ assumptions about 
the uncommercial and “simple” nature of NGOs in Africa, when compared 
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with the slick, professionalised marketing operations of well-known INGOs 
(Cottle & Nolan 2007; Magee 2014). Yet this misses a very basic, logical 
point: that it is precisely because such organisations are comparatively small 
and resource poor, that they may need to rely on more powerful actors in 
order to achieve media impact. These actors include expat executives work-
ing for major advertising and public relations multinationals, who are not 
only keen to break into the continent’s emerging markets, but also adept 
at generating the upbeat, technically sophisticated, and highly visual cam-
paigns likely to go viral on Twitter and Facebook.
What’s particularly interesting is that these expats deliberately crafted a 
value-laden and emotive story about Kenyan self-help and empowerment, 
while simultaneously maintaining interpretative control over the campaign 
in ways that served their own economic interests. Thus republishing the 
material they produced within the context of an uncritical, “positive” news 
story about “Africa” was potentially just as harmful as endlessly reproduc-
ing “negative” stories about the continent. This was because it played into 
simplistic grand narratives about “Africa Rising” that normalised and legiti-
mised privatised and media-centric conceptualisations of empowerment, 
while effacing profound socio-economic disparities. It also gave Scangroup 
and Safaricom commercial advantages in the continent’s emerging markets 
and political advantages to a particular party during a sensitive pre-election 
period, without addressing either of these issues explicitly. But most of all, 
it both entrenched and obscured the ascendance of commercial norms and 
practices over rigorous analysis and truth-telling in news coverage of the 
continent.
Notes
1 The findings of a broader research project (Wright 2015) are referred to through-
out this chapter in order to contextualise the case study in question.
2 This participant has since left the company.
3 This account of events was supported by other participants who were present, 
although it should be noted that in later correspondence a more senior executive 
at RedSky, who was not part of the study, denied that any argument had occurred.
4 This was part of a scheme funded by a news-related INGO, the David Astor Trust.
5 In total, 73 million Kenyan Shillings had been raised (nearly £500,000), although 
this was not enough to build the clinic.
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